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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20140749-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
James Raphael Sanchez (James) appeals his convictions for murder and 
obstructing justice. He challenges his murder conviction on the ground that the trial court 
wrongfully excluded evidence of out-of-court statements that James proffered under Rule 
106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. James proffered the evidence to support his theory of 
the case: special mitigation based on extreme emotional distress. The evidentiary 
exclusion was prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting this theory. James 
..J also challenges his obstructing justice conviction on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to support it. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 (2)0). See 
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment); R.726-27, 738-41, 746. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: In a recorded statement to police, James confessed to the assault that 
caused the death of Angela Jenkins (Angela) and explained that he assaulted Angela 
because she told him she was cheating on him with his brother. At trial, the prosecution 
introduced James' s confession to the assault. Under Rule 106, James proffered his 
explanation of why he assaulted Angela. The trial court denied the proffer. As a result, 
the jury was not instructed on James's theory of extreme emotional distress. Did the trial 
court reversibly err when it denied James' s Rule 106 proffer? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's "authority to allow evidence ... 'under Rule 
106 is not"' '"discretionary."' State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, iJIO, 76 P.3d 1165. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R.749:151-54, 161-68; 750:4-8. 
Issue II: Whether the evidence was insufficient to support James's conviction for 
obstructing justice because no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that James concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically intending to 
hinder the investigation of Angela's murder. 
Standard of Review: "When a defendant challenges a jury verdict for insufficiency 
of the evidence, '[the court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Noor, 2012 
UT App 187, iJ4, 283 P.3d 543 (memorandum decision). The court "will reverse the 
jury's verdict 'only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."' Id. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R.750:35-38. But to the extent the Court 
believes it is not, it should review the issue for plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 
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UT App 183, 13,282 P.3d 1066. "When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
under the plain error doctrine, 'a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency 
~ was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the 
jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 117, 10 P.3d 346). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following are attached at Addendum B: Utah Code §§76-5-203, 76-5-205.5, 
76-8-306; Utah R. Evid. 106. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged James with murder and obstructing justice. R.1-3. After a jury 
trial, James was convicted of both charges. R.642, 726-27; 750:110. He timely appeals. 
R.726-37. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
James and Angela were in a relationship and lived together in an apartment in Salt 
Lake City. R.748:30; 749:73-74, 94-96. They were in their apartment on the night of May 
~ 4, 2011, when Angela repeatedly told James that she was cheating on him with his 
brother. R.748:45-46, 57, 61-62; 749:80-82, 166-69. Enraged, James began to assault her, 
asking her to tell him she would end the affair. R.749:166-69. Angela would not accede 
to James's requests. R.749: 166-69. The incident continued into the early morning hours. 
R.749:90-91. At one point, James brought Angela into the bathroom to place her head 
,.;; under the bathtub faucet to wash blood off of her face and prevent her from losing 
consciousness. R.749:95-97. Sometime around 8 or 9 a.m., Angela, lying on her back on 
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the bedroom floor, lost consciousness as James applied pressure to her neck with his 
forearm. R.749:91-92, 97-99. She never woke up. R.749:91-92, 98-99. James laid down 
next to her and slept for an hour or two. R.749:92, 98. 
After James awoke, he called his friend, Roger Gary Warner (Roger). R.748:91-
92; 749:92. He was crying and scared because Angela was not waking up. R.748:91-92; 
749:142. He asked Roger to come pick him up. R.748:91-93; 749:92-93. He then called 
911 and reported that there was someone at his location who was not breathing. 
R.748: 125-27; 749:92-93. He left the door to the apartment slightly open for the police 
and left with Roger. R.748:76-77; 749:28. Five minutes after the first 911 call, James 
placed another 911 call from a pay phone at a nearby convenience store. R.748:100-01, 
131-36, 207; R.749:73-74, 117-18. He and Roger then went to Roger's house, where they 
took a nap in Roger's bed. R. 7 48: 102-04. Before James climbed into the bed, Roger told 
him to take off his pants because they had blood on them. R.748: 102. James complied. 
R.748: 102-03. 
The police arrived outside Roger's house after identifying James as the primary 
suspect in Angela's death and tracing his whereabouts. R.748:83, 205-12; 749:3-5, 73-75. 
They made several attempts to contact the inhabitants. R.749:4-6. After approximately an 
hour and a half, Roger emerged first. R.749:4-6. James came out approximately an hour 
and forty minutes later. R.749:6. He was wearing underwear without pants and shoes 
without socks. R.749:9. He informed the police that he had taken seventeen methadone 
pills. R.749:77, 119. He was arrested and taken to the hospital, where he received 
treatment for a methadone overdose. R.749:6, 119-20, 144. 
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Det. Chad Reyes (Reyes) interviewed James while James was recovering at the 
hospital. R.749:78-79. The interview was audio-recorded, and the recording was 
transcribed. R.749:87. In the interview, James confessed to the prolonged assault on 
~ Angela. R.749:81-92, 95-99. He explained that he did it because of the emotional distress 
he experienced after Angela repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his 
brother and refused to say that she would end the affair. R.749:166-68. He admitted that 
Angela lost consciousness and never regained it after he pressed his forearm into her 
neck. R.749:91-92, 97-99. He asked Reyes if Angela was "okay," if she had "ma[d]e it." 
R.749:139. When Reyes answered no, James was "distraught." R.749:141. 
At trial, the State introduced a portion of the statement James gave to Reyes at the 
hospital. R.749:78-99. Specifically, the State introduced James's confession to assaulting 
Angela. R.749:78-99. The confession was introduced through the testimony of Reyes, 
though he and the prosecutor explicitly relied on the transcript of the interview in 
presenting the testimony. R.749:85, 87, 93. 
Afterwards, James proffered a different part of his statement to Reyes. R.749:128-
33, 166-68. Specifically, he proffered his explanation to Reyes of why he assaulted 
Angela: she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his brother and she 
refused to say she would end the affair. R.749: 128-33, 166-68. James intended to use this 
evidence to support his theory of the case: he acted under the influence of extreme 
emotional distress. R.747:2, 5; 748:42-43; 749:130, 163-64, 171-72; 750:4-5, 13; see also 
~ Utah Code §76-5-205.S(l)(b) ("Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death 
of another ... under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
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reasonable explanation or excuse."). James offered the evidence on the ground that 
Angela's statements were not hearsay, and his statement, although hearsay, was 
admissible under Rules 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R.749:152-54, 161-64. He 
also argued that excluding the evidence would deprive him of his right to present a 
defense. R.749:163-64; see also R.149:130. 
The trial court denied the proffer, ruling that the evidence constituted double 
hearsay that did not qualify for admission under Rule 106. R.750:4-12. The court 
reasoned that the proffered part of James's statement was a "self-serving, after-the-fact 
explanation" for the assault that was "temporally removed" from the inculpatory part 
introduced by the prosecution. R.750:8. As a result of the ruling, James conceded that the 
evidence did not support a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress, and no such 
instruction was given. R.750: 13. 
At the close of evidence, James moved for a directed verdict on the obstructing 
justice charge, arguing that the evidence failed to show that James acted with the 
requisite intent. R.750:35-36. The trial court denied the motion. R.750:38. In closing 
argument, the prosecution argued that James was guilty of obstructing justice because the 
evidence showed that he cleaned Angela and the apartment after Angela died but before 
he left with Roger. R.750:65-66, 72-73, 96. Alternatively, the prosecution argued that 
James was guilty of obstructing justice because he traveled from the apartment to Roger's 
house wearing his pants and socks, which had Angela's blood on them. R.750:66-67. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying James' s Rule 106 proffer of the part of his 
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela: she repeatedly told 
~ him that she was cheating on him with his brother. The trial court ruled that the evidence 
was inadmissible double hearsay on the ground that James's statement and Angela's 
statement were both offered for the truth of the matter asserted. This ruling was incorrect. 
Angela's statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It was offered to 
explain why James assaulted Angela, regardless of the statement's truth. James's 
statement, on the other hand, was hearsay. But it was nevertheless admissible under Rule 
106 because it was relevant to James' s theory of special mitigation based on extreme 
emotional distress and it was necessary to qualify the part of James statement introduced 
by the prosecution in which James confessed to the assault that caused Angela's death. 
The denial of James's Rule 106 proffer was prejudicial because it precluded James from 
presenting his theory of the case, to wit, he was entitled to special mitigation because he 
killed Angela under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there was a 
..J reasonable explanation or excuse. 
The evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to sustain James' s conviction for 
obstructing justice because there was no evidence that James ever concealed or destroyed 
~ 
evidence specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder. 
Culpability can be implied from the actions and statements of the defendant, but the 
vJ evidence must be clear enough that the jury does not have to speculate. James' s 




Under Rule 106, the trial court was required to admit the part of James's 
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela because 
it was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the part of the 
statement in which James confessed to the assault. Excluding the evidence 
was prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting his theory of 
the case. 
The excluded evidence at issue is James's out-of-court statement to Reyes that he 
assaulted Angela because she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his 
brother. R.749:166-68; 750:4-12. The trial court ruled that this evidence constituted 
inadmissible double hearsay. R.750:6; see also Utah R. Evid. 805 ("Hearsay within 
hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined 
statements conforms with an exception to the rule."). Thus, as a preliminary matter, it is 
necessary to address whether the court was correct that James's statement and Angela's 
statement were both hearsay. See Prosper, Inc. v. Dep 't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT 
App 281, ~8, 168 P.3d 344 ("The determination of whether evidence constitutes hearsay 
is a question of law that we review for correctness."). 
It was not. Angela's statement was not hearsay. And although James's statement 
was hearsay, it was admissible hearsay. 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by [the Utah Rules of 
Evidence]." Utah R. Evid. 802. "'Hearsay' means a statement that ... the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing ... and ... a party offers in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 80l(c) 
(emphasis added); see also State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, ~27, 335 P.3d 900 
8 
Q 
("[O]ut-of-court statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are by 
definition not hearsay."). Therefore, the "hearsay rule does not bar" a statement offered 
"without regard to whether it be true or false." McCullar, 2014 UT App 215,127 
~ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Angela's statement is not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted in it. It was offered to explain James's conduct, not to prove that Angela 
was cheating on James with his brother. R.749:153-55. In fact, whether Angela was 
actually cheating on James was irrelevant to James' s theory of extreme emotional 
distress. 1 All that mattered for James' s theory is that Angela told James she was cheating 
on him with his brother-regardless of whether it was true-which caused James extreme 
emotional distress under the influence of which he committed the assault. See Utah Code 
§76-5-205.5(1)(b); see also McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 127 (explaining that a 
statement offered simply to show that '"the statement was made,"' "'without regard to 
whether it be true or false,"' is not hearsay) (quoting State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390-91 
(Utah 1957)). Because Angela's statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
..J asserted in it, it is not hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 80l(c). Hence, the trial court was 
incorrect that the excluded evidence constituted double hearsay. 
On the other hand, James's statement is concededly hearsay. It was offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in it: that Angela repeatedly told him that she was 
cheating on him with his brother. But it was nevertheless admissible hearsay under Rule 
1 Notably, the trial court acknowledged this on the first day of trial. R.747:3. This 
acknowledgement is at odds with the court's ruling on the last day of trial that Angela's 
statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See R.750:6. 
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106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See infra Point I.A. And excluding the statement was 
prejudicial because it deprived James of the ability to present his theory of the case. See 
infra Point I.B. 
A. Under Rule 106, the trial court was required to admit the portion of James 's 
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela because it 
was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the inculpatory 
portion of the statement that was introduced by the prosecution. 
The common law rule of completeness "generally provides that a party may 
introduce the whole of a statement if any part is introduced by the opposing party." State 
v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ~9, 76 P.3d 1165. Under that rule, when the prosecution 
presents part of a defendant's out-of-court statement and the "statement contains both 
disserving and self-serving [parts], the whole must be admitted and considered by the 
jury" at the defendant's request. State v. Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah 1935), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943); see also State v. 
Martin, 300 P. 1034, 1038 (Utah 1931) (same). Of course, the jury need not give the 
disserving and self-serving parts equal credit. Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109; Martin, 300 P. at 
1038. 
The common law rule of completeness is partially codified in Rule 106 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Utah R. Evid. 106; Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ~9; State v. Leleae, 1999 
UT App 368, ,J43, 993 P.2d 232. Rule 106 provides: 
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse 
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other 
writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the 
same time. 
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Utah R. Evid. 106. It requires the admission of"those portions of a statement relevant 
and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced." 
Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 143 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cruz-Meza, 
~ 2003 UT 32, 114 (same). Under Rule 106, "the exculpatory portion of 
a defendant's statement should be admitted if it is relevant to an issue in the case and 
necessary to clarify or explain the portion received." United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 
1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 106); see also Utah R. Evid. 106 
advisory committee's note ("This rule is the federal rule, verbatim."). 
As our supreme court has explained, Rule 106 "merely requires that the material 
sought to be admitted 'ought in fairness' to be admitted with the portion already 
introduced.'' Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 114. Moreover, a trial court's "authority to allow 
evidence ... 'under Rule 106 is not"' discretionary. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 11 0; see 
also id. 1,9-15 ( explaining that the doctrine of oral completeness contained in Rule 611 
affords trial courts discretion while Rule 106 does not). 
In Leleae, the prosecution presented inculpatory parts of an out-of-court statement 
.,j) that the defendant, Leleae, gave to a detective. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ,,38-41. The 
statement was recorded and transcribed, but the prosecution introduced the inculpatory 
parts through the detective's testimony. Id. 1138, 41. Leleae moved to admit the entire 
statement, which also contained exculpatory parts, under Rule 106. Id. ,143-44. The trial 
court denied Leleae's motion. Id. ,138-41 & 140 n.4. It ruled that Rule 106 did not apply. 
Id. 140 n.4. In the alternative, the court decided to exclude the statement even if Rule 106 
11 
applied on the ground that the statement was self-serving. Id. ,r40 n.4. Leleae was 
convicted of aggravated assault. Id. ,r1. 
On appeal, this Court held that Rule 106 applied because Leleae's statement "was 
tape recorded and then transcribed from that recording." Id. ,r44. But the Court further 
held that the trial court did not err in denying Leleae's request to admit the entire 
statement because Leleae presented the exculpatory parts of the statement during cross-
examination of the detective and "other testimony supported his version of the events." 
Id. ,r,r45-46. Thus, Leleae was able to introduce the parts of his statement that were 
"'necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context"' the parts presented by the 
prosecution. Id. ,r,r43, 45-46. Accordingly, the Court concluded that admitting Leleae's 
entire statement was not '"necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context"' the parts 
of it presented by the prosecution. Id. ,r43. 
Leleae is the only Utah appellate opinion applying Rule 106,2 but cases from other 
jurisdictions are instructive. Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376 (D.C. 2006), is one 
example. There, the defendant, Cox, was charged with several possession crimes, 
including unlawful firearm possession and carrying a pistol without a license. Id. at 378. 
The prosecutor elicited testimony from the arresting officer that Cox never said he had a 
license for the firearm. Id. at 379. Invoking the federal counterpart to Rule 106, the 
defendant proffered part of Cox's out-of-court statement to the officer that explained why 
he was in possession of the firearm: "he had gone to the firing range the night before and 
2 However, State v. Cruz-Meza interprets Rule 106 in some depth. 2003 UT 32, ,r,r9-15, 
76 P.3d 1165. 
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had forgotten about the gun after putting it in the car." Id. at 3 79-81. The trial court 
denied the proffer, and Cox was convicted. Id. at 378-80. On appeal, the court held that 
the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered was relevant to Cox's 
l.@ defense and it was necessary to qualify the officer's testimony that Cox never said he had 
a license for the firearm. Id. at 381-82. However, the court found that the error was 
harmless, in large part because Cox himself testified to the proffered statement. Id. at 
382-83. 
Another example is State v. Cabrera-Pena, 605 S.E.2d 522 (S.C. 2004). There, the 
defendant, Cabrera-Pena, was charged with murder in the shooting death of his estranged 
wife. Id. at 523-24. At trial, the State introduced out-of-court inculpatory statements 
Cabrera-Pena made to police. Id. at 523-25. Cabrera-Pena then proffered a written 
statement he made to police indicating that he did not intend to shoot the victim. Id. at 
523. The trial court denied the proffer, and Cabrera-Pena was convicted. Id. at 523-24. 
On certiorari, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred because 
the proffered statement "tend[ ed] to explain or qualify" the inculpatory statements 
v) introduced by the prosecution. Id. at 523-26; see also Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1276, 
1278-81 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting 
portions of defendant's television interview in which he admitted to uncharged crimes 
and precluding defendant from introducing other portions of interview). 
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that Rule 106 applies because James' s 
statement to Reyes was recorded and then transcribed. R.750:7; Leleae, 1999 UT App 
368, ,I44. But, as in Cox and Cabrera-Pena, the trial court erred by prohibiting James 
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from introducing the exculpatory (or mitigating) parts of his statement to Reyes. In the 
part of the statement that James sought to introduce, he explained to Reyes why he 
assaulted Angela: she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his brother. 
R. 7 49: 166-68. So, the part James sought to introduce was '"relevant"' to his theory of 
extreme emotional distress and it was "'necessary to qualify, explain, or place into 
context"' the inculpatory parts introduced by the prosecution. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 
143. 
Thus, this case is unlike Leleae. There, the defendant was able to introduce the 
parts of his statement that were "'relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, and place 
into context"' the parts introduced by the prosecution. Id. 1143, 45-46. He was also able 
to present other evidence supporting his theory of the case. Id. iJ145-46. So, in Leleae, 
admitting the defendant's proffered evidence-his entire statement-was unnecessary. 
Id. 1143, 45-46. Here, however, James did not seek to introduce his entire statement, but 
only selected parts that were "'relevant"' to his theory of the case and "'necessary to 
qualify, explain, or place into context"' the parts introduced by the prosecution. Id. ,J43. 
Moreover, James was unable to present any other evidence supporting his theory of the 
case.3 To put it succinctly, the difference between this case and Leleae is that the 
3 Although not a relevant consideration under Rule 106, it is perhaps notable that James 
would not have been able to testify to Angela's statement even if he had taken the stand 
because the trial court ruled that her statement was inadmissible hearsay. R.750:6; see 
also United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that a trial 
court cannot deny a defendant's proffer under the federal counterpart to Rule 106 on the 
basis that the defendant decided not to testify); State v. Cabrera-Pena, 605 S.E.2d 522, 
524-25 (S.C. 2004) (holding that a trial court cannot deny a defendant's proffer under 




proffered evidence here was "'necessary,"' whereas the proffered evidence in Leleae was 
not. Id. 
The trial court gave two reasons for denying James's proffer: (1) the part of his 
~ statement he sought to introduce was "self-serving" and (2) it was "temporally removed" 
from the parts introduced by the prosecution. R.750:8. Neither of these reasons is valid 
for excluding evidence offered under Rule I 06. 
A trial court may not exclude a statement offered under Rule 106 on the basis that 
it is self-serving, for three related reasons. First, Rule I 06 is a partial codification of the 
common law rule of completeness, Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,i9, which expressly allowed 
a defendant to introduce relevant "self-serving" parts of his out-of-court statement when 
the prosecution introduced "disserving" parts of the statement against him. Dunkley, 39 
P.2d at 1109; Martin, 300 P. at 1038. Second, the self-servingness of a statement is 
relevant only to its "trustworthiness, [which is] a consideration absent from [R]ule 106." 
Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,II 4. It is for the jury, not the court, to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of a statement under Rule I 06. See Dunkley, 39 P .2d at 1109; Martin, 300 
..iJ P. at 1038. Third, a central purpose of Rule 106 is to allow parties to introduce self-
serving statements that qualify, explain, or put into context disserving statements 
introduced against them under the opposing party-declarant rule. See Utah R. Evid. 
80 I ( d)(2); see also Baker, 432 F .3d at 1223 ("[T]he exculpatory portion of 
testify). Thus, even if James had testified, and even if he had been able to testify to his 
belief that Angela was cheating on him with his brother, he still would have been unable 
to testify to Angela's statement, and therefore he would have been unable to present 
evidence that he acted "under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there 
is a reasonable explanation or excuse." Utah Code §76-5-205.S(l)(b) (emphasis added). 
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a defendant's statement should be admitted if it is relevant to an issue in the case and 
necessary to clarify or explain the portion received."). Indeed, it is difficult to think of 
many other scenarios in which Rule 106 would be useful. Accordingly, Rule 106 would 
be significantly undermined if statements offered pursuant to it could be excluded 
because they are self-serving. 
The fact that the part of a statement proffered under Rule 106 is "temporally 
removed" from the part already introduced is also not a valid basis for denying the 
proffer. See R.750:8. Rule 106 states: 
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse 
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other 
writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the 
same time. 
Utah R. Evid. 106 (emphases added). The emphasized language demonstrates that the 
touchstone of Rule 106 is fairness without regard to the temporal proximity of the 
pertinent parts of the statement. As our supreme court has explained, the '"fairness' 
standard" requires the admission of any other portion that is '"relevant and necessary to 
qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced."' Cruz-Meza, 2003 
UT 32, 114 (quoting Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 143). Thus, the question under Rule 106 
concerns only the substantive relationship, not the temporal relationship, between the 
proffered and already-received parts of the statement. See id.; Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 
,I43. Indeed, it is impossible to see how temporal proximity factors into Rule 106 when 
the rule also requires "the introduction ... of any other writing or recorded statement" if 
fairness demands it. Utah R. Evid. 106 (emphasis added). Additionally, Cruz-Meza 
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further clarifies that while "temporal[] remote[ ness ]" may be a proper consideration 
under the doctrine of oral completeness contained in Rule 611, it is not under Rule 106. 
Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 119-14. 
In sum, the trial court erred in excluding the part of James 's statement to Reyes in 
which James explained why he committed the assault that caused Angela's death. That 
part of James's statement was relevant to his theory of extreme emotional distress and it 
was necessary to explain, qualify, and put into context the inculpatory parts of the 
statement that the prosecution introduced. 
B. The trial court's erroneous denial of James 's Rule 106 proffer was 
prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting his theory of the case. 
The trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling prejudiced James. "An erroneous 
decision to exclude evidence constitutes reversible error only if the error is harmful." 
State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 153, 335 P.3d 900. "And 'an error is harmful if it is 
~ reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."' Id. (alteration 
omitted). However, the error here deprived James of his due process right to present a 
complete defense. See Holmes v. S. Carolina, 54 7 U.S. 319, 324 (2006); McCullar, 2014 
UT App 215, 1153-59. Because the error "'result[ed] in the deprivation of a constitutional 
right, [this Court] [should] apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction 
Jj unless [it] find[s] the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Crowley, 2014 




Trial errors that preclude a defendant from presenting his theory of the case are 
prejudicial. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); Watters v. Querry, 626 
P.2d 455,458 (Utah 1981); Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 120-21 (Utah 1942); McCullar, 
2014 UT App 215, 1153-59; see also State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13,124, 152 P.3d 315 
('" [W]hen an element of the crime is in dispute, and the evidence is consistent with both 
the defendant's and the State's theory of the case, failing to instruct on the lesser included 
offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial and our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined."' (alteration omitted)); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 
1201-02 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The right to have the jury instructed as to the defendant's 
theory of the case is one of those rights 'so basic to a fair trial' that failure to instruct 
where there is evidence to support the instruction can never be considered harmless 
error."). For example, "[w]here there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory of 
the case, it is prejudical [sic] error for the trial court to fail to instruct thereon." Watters, 
626 P.2d at 458. And, as this Court recently held in McCullar, erroneous evidentiary 
rulings are prejudicial when they deprive a defendant of the ability to present his theory 
of the case to the jury. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 1~53-59. 
When a trial court's erroneous ruling completely precludes a defendant from 
presenting his theory of the case, the jury has no opportunity to find the facts pertaining 
to the theory, and an appellate court may not sit as a finder of fact. See Utah Code §§77-
17-10(1) ("In a jury trial, questions oflaw are to be determined by the court, questions of 
fact by the jury."), 78B-5-102 ("All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, ... are to 
be decided by the jury, and all evidence is to be addressed to them .... "); State v. 
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Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,i38, 70 P.3d 111 ("We do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do 
we substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder[.]" (internal quotation marks, 
citations, and alterations omitted)); State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 116, 25 P.3d 985 ("It is 
~ the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility 
of the witnesses." (internal quotation marks and emphases omitted)); State v. Rowley, 
2008 UT App 233,116, 189 P.3d 109 ("It is within the province of the jury to weigh the 
evidence, to decide what weight to give any conflicting evidence, and to make credibility 
detenninations; we will not substitute our impressions for the jury's findings on those 
matters."). Therefore, in such circumstances, a new trial is required. 
Such circumstances exist here. The trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling 
completely precluded James from presenting his theory of the case: he was entitled to 
special mitigation because he assaulted Angela under extreme emotional distress caused 
by her repeatedly telling him that she was cheating on him with his brother.4 See Utah 
Code §76-5-205.S(l)(b). If the trial court had admitted the proffered evidence as it should 
have, James would have been entitled to a jury instruction on special mitigation due to 
,;; extreme emotional distress. Cf State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,,r9-13, 63 P.3d 94; see 
also State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, 129, 309 P.3d 1160 ("Each party is entitled to 
have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any 
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. Thus, if a rational jury could find a factual 
basis in the evidence to support the theory, the trial court is obligated to give the 
~ instruction." (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)). Furthermore, 
4 See supra n.3. 
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the jury may well have found special mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence, 
thereby reducing James's conviction from murder to manslaughter. See Utah Code §76-5-
205.5(5). Indeed, the evidence was consistent with James's theory that he acted "under 
the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there [was] a reasonable 
explanation or excuse." Utah Code §76-5-205.5(1)(b). However, as a result of the trial 
court's erroneous ruling, there was no evidence to support James's theory, and the jury 
was not instructed on it. Therefore, trial court's error was prejudicial, and a new trial is 
required. 
II. The evidence was insufficient to support James's conviction for 
obstructing justice because no reasonable jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that James concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence 
specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder. 
This Court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence when, viewing 
"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict," "the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,I15, 63 P.3d 94. "A 
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only 
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. ,II 8 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). The Court "cannot take a speculative leap across a remaining 
[evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict." Id. "Every element of the crime charged 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Harman, 767 P .2d 567, 568 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). "If the evidence does not support those elements, the verdict must fail." 
20 
Id. Thus, a verdict fails for insufficient evidence if "the facts shown are reasonably 
reconcilable with other [innocent] possibilities," State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197, 199 
(Utah 1978), or if "reasonable explanations [for the evidence] exist" that are consistent 
~ with innocence. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il 8. "Culpability can be implied from the 
actions and statements of the defendant, but the evidence must be clear enough that the 
jury does not have to guess." Harman, 767 P.2d at 569. 
"An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, 
or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense ... alters, destroys, conceals, 
or removes any item or other thing." Utah Code §76-8-306(1)(c); cf R.668. Obstructing 
justice "is a crime of specific intent." State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I13, 305 P.3d 1058. 
In State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court held that 
there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of obstructing justice for 
allegedly concealing evidence that her long-term houseguest was sexually abusing her 
young daughter. Id. at 1204-05, ajf'd, 852 P.2d 981, 987. There, the defendant knew that, 
vJJ among other things, the guest gave bras and a revealing gymnastics suit to the daughter, 
made long-distance phone calls to the daughter when he was away, and was accused of 
inappropriately touching the daughter at a pool. Workman, 806 P.2d at 1199-1201, 1204. 
The guest had also told the defendant that he wanted to marry the daughter. Id. at 1200, 
1204. The State argued that these facts gave rise to an inference that the defendant knew 
..;, of the abuse. Id. at 1204. It further claimed that the defendant was motivated to conceal 
the evidence because she shared a joint account with the guest into which the guest 
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deposited hundreds of dollars. Id. The Court disagreed, holding the evidence failed to 
show that the defendant "was aware" the guest '\vas sexually exploiting" the daughter 
"and that ... she helped him conceal the crime." Id. at 1205. It also concluded that "it 
[was] inherently improbable that, even if [the defendant] were aware of the abuse, the 
joint bank account would have motivated [her] to conceal [the guest's] abuse of her 
daughter.'· Id. It noted the undisputed evidence that the defendant reprimanded the guest 
whenever she believed he was acting inappropriately with the daughter and cooperated 
with the police once they informed her that the guest was under investigation. Id. at 1204-
05. 
Workman appears to be the only Utah case finding the evidence insufficient to 
support a conviction for obstructing justice. But see Bingham, 575 P.2d at 199 (holding 
that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of second degree felony 
obstructing justice, but sufficient to convict defendant of class B misdemeanor 
obstructing justice). However, there are at least three Utah cases finding the evidence 
insufficient to support evidence tampering, a crime very similar to the variation of 
obstructing justice charged in this case and with a similar specific intent. See Shumway, 
2002 UT 124, ififl5-18; State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,r,r11-20, 2 P.3d 954; State 
v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). These cases are instructive. 
In Shumway, the defendant, Shumway, stabbed the victim thirty-nine times. 
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,r2. The police found a knife that they believed was used in the 
stabbing, but the medical examiner determined that some of the victim's wounds were 
caused by a second implement, which was never found. Id. In addition to a murder 
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charge, the State charged Shumway with evidence tampering for allegedly concealing the 
\@ 
second implement. Id. 112-3, 15. He was convicted. Id. 13. 
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Shumway claimed that the evidence was 
~ insufficient to support his conviction for evidence tampering. Id. ~15. In response, the 
State argued that there were three key pieces of evidence supporting the conviction: (I) 
there was approximately an hour of unaccounted for time in which Shumway could have 
disposed of the second implement; (2) Shumway had moved some other items, 
specifically blankets and socks, that had blood on them as a result of the stabbing; and (3) 
several months after the stabbing, Shumway wrote in a journal entry, "'Do they know 
what kind of knife is the other."' Id. 117. The court was unpersuaded by the State's 
argument. Id. 118. It stated: "At most, the evidence supports only the proposition that 
[Shumway] had the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it 
ever existed .... Other reasonable explanations exist why the instrument was not found .. 
. . Only speculation supports the conviction." Id. Holding that the evidence was 
insufficient, the court reversed Shumway's conviction and dismissed the charge. Id. 119. 
In Gonzales, the defendant, Gonzales, was riding in the backseat of a car from 
which the driver fired shots at another automobile. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ~3. 
After seeing police while stopped at a traffic light, the driver tossed the gun into the glove 
compartment. Id. 14. But when police pulled the car over based on a report of the 
shooting, they found the gun behind the glove compartment. Id. 115-6. They also found 
marijuana underneath the backseat and an extra ammunition clip for the gun in 
Gonzales's pocket. Id. ~6. Gonzales admitted that the marijuana was his. Id. The State 
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charged Gonzales with evidence tampering, alleging that he hid the marijuana or 
encouraged or aided the driver in hiding the gun. Id. ~'if7-9. Gonzales was convicted. Id. 
On appeal to this Court, Gonzales challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his conviction. Id. ~I 0. As a preliminary matter, the Court held that the 
applicable evidence tampering statute required Gonzales to have concealed the evidence 
believing that an investigation was pending or imminent. Id. ~15. Regarding the gun, the 
State argued that the clip in Gonzales's pocket "tied" him to the gun, so he must have 
encouraged the driver to hide the gun. Id. 'ifl 7. The Court quickly disposed of this 
argument, noting simply that "the State presented no evidence to support this inference." 
Id. Alternatively, the State argued that Gonzales "took the extra clip to disperse evidence 
and thus assisted in misdirecting the police." Id. 'if I 8. The Court stated, "it is just as 
possible, absent any evidence presented by the State, that [Gonzales] had the clip in his 
pocket" prior to the shooting. Id. The Court concluded, "by merely establishing 
[Gonzales]'s possession of the extra clip, the State did not present sufficient evidence 
from which the jury could infer timing, concealment, and intent to conceal the gun 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
Regarding the marijuana, the State argued that Gonzales's admission to owning 
the marijuana and the fact that "it was found under the back seat" gave rise to a 
reasonable inference that Gonzales concealed the marijuana believing an investigation 
was imminent. Id. 'if I 9. The Court was unpersuaded. Id. ~20. At trial, Gonzales argued 
that he put the marijuana under the seat before the shooting. Id. Because the State failed 
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to produce any evidence that Gonzales put the marijuana under the seat after the 
shooting, the Court held that the evidence failed to establish that Gonzales "hid the 
marijuana believing an investigation was going to occur and in order to impede the 
@ investigation." Id. Accordingly, the Court reversed. Id. ,I2 l. 
~ 
Finally, in Harman, the defendant, Harman, was chief of the investigations 
division of a county attorney's office. Harman, 767 P.2d at 567. He was tasked with 
investigating the origin of a fire that damaged a mall. Id. The county's mental health 
offices were located in the mall. Id. Harman enlisted Ralph Tolman and Jim Ashby to 
separately investigate the fire and prepare reports. Id. at 567-68. Dean Larsen, the 
assistant chief of a local fire department, also investigated the fire. Id. at 567. Larsen and 
Tolman both concluded that the fire originated inside the mental health offices, while 
Ashby concluded it did not. Id. at 567-68. Harman, however, rejected Tolman's report 
after sending a copy of it to the "supervisor of the county attorney's civil division, and 
possibly several others." Id. at 568. After "Larsen disclosed the existence of [Tolman's] 
report during a deposition conducted pursuant to a civil suit over [the county's] liability 
va for the fire," Harman was charged with attempted evidence tampering for rejecting the 
report. Id. 
At trial, the prosecution relied on evidence of Harman's out-of-court statement 
that "the report would make the county look bad, cost the county millions, and make the 
county liable." Id. at 569. Harman, on the other hand, testified that he rejected the report 
because it "'parroted"' Larsen's opinion, "contained unsupported factual assertions, and 
was a 'bad report."' Id. Hannan was convicted. Id. at 567. 
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On appeal, this Court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to convict Hannan. 
Id. at 569. It noted that Harman made no attempt to conceal or destroy copies of the 
report that he had given to other people. Id. It concluded that the State failed to present 
any evidence that Harman rejected the report for improper reasons and not simply 
because it was a bad report. Id. The Court said, "[ c ]ulpability can be implied from the 
actions and statements of the defendant, but the evidence must be clear enough that the 
jury does not have to guess." Id. It held that the evidence of Hannan's guilt "was so 
slight, so conflicting, and so inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not have" 
found him guilty. Id. 
The relevant evidence supporting James's obstructing justice conviction, in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, is the following.5 
I. When Reyes asked James "ifhe attempted to clean it up at all," James said that, 
before Angela lost consciousness for the last time, he tried to clean her with 
hydrogen peroxide and water in the bathtub in order to awaken her and render her 
first aid. R.749:95-96, 122-24, 144. 
2. On a dresser in the bedroom where Angela's body was found, police found an 
empty hydrogen peroxide bottle with no cap. R.749:19-20; State's Ex. 51. Det. 
Todd Park testified that the hydrogen peroxide bottle was "larger ... than what I'd 
normally have at my house." R.749:20. But see State's Ex. 51 (depicting a fairly 
standard hydrogen peroxide bottle). He also testified that hydrogen peroxide is for 
cleaning wounds. R.749:30. 
3. On the bedroom floor where Angela's body was found, police found an empty 
spray bottle that had contained an antiseptic solution for disinfecting wounds, 
some empty water bottles, an empty pink washbasin that had some blood smears 
inside of it, open gauze packaging, and some used gauze, wet with blood and 
water, near Angela's body. R.749:18, 20-22, 28; State's Exs. 52-53, 55-57. 
5 See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9); State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,i,J40-44, 326 P.3d 645. 
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4. In the bedroom, there was some blood that appeared to be diluted on the walls and 
on a lightswitch. R.749:24, 26; State's Exs. 60-61, 63. A hamper in the bedroom 
contained a bunch of towels and clothing that was wet with blood and water. 
R.749: 17, 19; State's Ex. 50. There was a white towel with blood on it on the 
floor. R.749:21; State's Ex. 55. There were bloodstains throughout the bedroom 
and bathroom. R.749:17-24, 39; State's Exs. 7A, 50-68B, 75. 
5. Blood had been washed down the drain of the bathtub and the bathroom sink. 
R.749:33-38; State's Exs. 66A-67B. There were traces of blood on the bathroom 
floor. R.749:33-37; State's Exs. 68A-68B. 
6. After Angela lost consciousness for the last time, James laid down next to her and 
slept for an hour or two. R.749:92, 98. Soon after he woke up, he called Roger to 
come pick him up. R.748:91-93; 749:92-93. It took Roger approximately twenty-
five minutes to arrive. R.748:94. Roger waited for James for approximately five to 
ten minutes. R.748:94-95. Before James left with Roger, he called the police. 
R.748:125-27; 749:92-93. He left the door open for them on his way out of the 
apartment. R.748:76-77; 749:28. 
7. When Roger and James got to Roger's house, James said he needed a nap. 
R.748:102. Roger told him to take his pants off because they had blood on them. 
R.748: 102. James took his pants off and he and Roger took a nap in Roger's bed. 
R.748:102-03. 
8. When James emerged from Roger's house to tum himself in to the police, he was 
not wearing pants or socks. R. 7 49 :9. The police found James' s pants and socks in 
plain view in Roger's bedroom. R.749:7-8; State's Exs. 41-45. They had blood on 
them. R.749:7-8; State's Exs. 41-45. James's wallet containing his social security 
card was in a pocket of the pants. R.749:8; State's Exs. 43-44. 
The jury was instructed to find James guilty of obstructing justice only if he 
"altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or other thing ... with intent to 
hinder, delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense ... AND 
... the defendant's conduct constituted the criminal offense of murder." R.668; cf Utah 
Code §76-8-306(1 )( c ). Thus, James could be convicted of obstructing justice only if he 
concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically intending to hinder the 
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investigation of Angela's murder. See State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, ~52-55, 325 P.3d 87 
(holding that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be evaluated in light of 
the applicable statute "as the statute was presented in the jury instructions"). From the 
evidence, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that James did so. 
There was no evidence that James planned to kill Angela. All the evidence was to 
the contrary.6 In fact, James was uncertain that Angela was dead until Reyes told him that 
she was. R.748:97; 749:139, 141. Therefore, James's obstructingjustice conviction 
cannot be based on conduct that occurred before Angela died. In this case, as in 
Gonzales, timing was critical: the prosecution needed to prove that James concealed 
evidence with the requisite specific intent after Angela died. 7 It failed. 
The prosecution presented no evidence that James cleaned Angela or the 
apartment after she died. It produced no evidence of when the supposedly diluted blood 
smears formed on the wall, when the pile of towels and clothes wet with blood and water 
was created, when the hydrogen peroxide bottle and antiseptic spray bottle were emptied, 
or when blood was washed down the drain in the bathtub and bathroom sink. Moreover, 
the prosecution's allegation that James intended to hinder the investigation was belied by 
the fact that bloodstains pervaded the crime scene and James himself called the police 
and left the door open for them. Cf Harman, 767 P.2d at 569 (finding the evidence 
insufficient in part because Harman did not attempt to conceal or destroy copies of the 
6 The prosecution acknowledged this. R.750:98. 
7 The prosecution implicitly acknowledged this by arguing that James was guilty of 
obstructing justice because he cleaned Angela and the apartment after Angela died but 
before he left with Roger. R.750:65-66, 72-73, 96. 
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report he gave to other people). The evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to 
the verdict, was consistent with James' s explanation that he cleaned Angela before she 
died to prevent her from losing consciousness and render her first aid. Cf id.; Gonzales, 
~ 2000 UT App 136, ,I20; Workman, 806 P.2d at 1204-05. In arguing its case, the 
prosecution simply encouraged the jury to disbelieve James's explanation and to 
speculate that James tried to clean the crime scene sometime after Angela died but before 
he left with Roger. R.750:65-66, 72-73, 96; cf Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 1~17-18 (holding 
that the evidence was insufficient because at best it supported the inference that 
Shumway had ''the opportunity" to dispose of the second implement, not that he did so); 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,I20 (holding that the evidence was insufficient because 
Gonzales testified that he put the marijuana under the seat before the shooting and the 
State did not produce any evidence to the contrary); Harman, 767 P.2d at 569 (holding 
that the evidence was insufficient because it was consistent with Hannan's explanation 
that he rejected the report because it was a bad report). Therefore, the evidence 
purporting to show that James cleaned Angela or the apartment cannot sustain his 
~ conviction. 
Even if one could reasonably infer that James at some point planned to ultimately 
kill Angela, the evidence purporting to show that James cleaned Angela and the 
apartment before she died is insufficient to show that he concealed evidence specifically 
intending to hinder the investigation of her murder. James explained to Reyes that he 
~ cleaned Angela to prevent her from losing consciousness and render her first aid, and the 
prosecution presented no evidence to the contrary. Cf Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,20; 
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Harman, 767 P.2d at 569. Nor did the prosecution present any evidence of how the 
supposedly diluted blood stains formed on the wall, under what circumstances the pile of 
towels and clothes wet with blood and water was created, under what circumstances the 
hydrogen peroxide bottle and antiseptic spray bottle were emptied, or under what 
circumstances blood was washed down the drain in the bathtub and bathroom sink. It 
would be speculative to conclude that James concealed or destroyed evidence specifically 
intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder before Angela died. See 
Harman, 767 P.2d at 569 ("Culpability can be implied from the actions and statements of 
the defendant, but the evidence must be clear enough that the jury does not have to 
guess."). Thus, even if conduct occurring before Angela's death theoretically could 
sustain the verdict, on this record it fails to do so. 
Nor can James's conviction be sustained by the fact that he left his pants and socks 
inside Roger's bedroom when he turned himself in. 8 There was no evidence that James 
concealed his pants and socks with the specific intent to hinder the investigation. 
Furthermore, the evidence supports the conclusion that James did not intend to hinder the 
investigation. Roger told James to take his pants off before getting into bed to take a nap 
because they had blood on them, and James obeyed. In all probability, he removed his 
socks as well, since they had blood on them, too. When James turned himself in to the 
police, he left his pants and socks in plain view in Roger's bedroom; he did not conceal 
them. The pants and socks still had blood on them. When the police searched Roger's 
house after James turned himself in, they easily found the pants and socks. R.749:7-8; 
8 Notably, the prosecution never argued that it could. 
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State's Exs. 41-45. The pants were on a chair and the socks were on the floor next to the 
chair. R.749:7-8; State's Exs. 41-45. A pocket in the pants contained James's wallet, 
which had his social security card in it. And shortly after James turned himself in, he 
~ confessed to the assault that caused Angela's death. All of this evidence weighs heavily 
against the proposition that James concealed his pants and socks in Roger's bedroom 
specifically intending to hinder the investigation into Angela's murder. 
The prosecutor suggested that the jury could find James guilty of obstructing 
justice because he wore the bloody pants and socks when he traveled from the apartment 
to Roger's house. R.750:66-67. This suggestion is absurd. The evidence indicates that 
James was wearing the pants and socks during the assault. One cannot reasonably infer 
specific intent to hinder the investigation from the mere fact that James did not change 
clothes when he left the apartment. On the contrary, if James really wanted to hinder the 
investigation, he would have changed into clean pants and socks. That would have made 
it somewhat more difficult for the police to tie him to Angela's death. In short, the 
prosecution presented no evidence that James wore the pants and socks with a specific 
~ intent to hinder the investigation. That's because James only wore them for the usual 
purpose: to cover his legs and feet. 
In sum, there was no evidence that James ever concealed or destroyed evidence 
specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder. Even viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive [ and] 
<.&) inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that [James] committed [obstruction of justice]." Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il5. The 
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evidence was not "clear enough that the jury [did] not have to guess" about James's 
culpability. Harman, 767 P.2d at 569. It failed to eliminate reasonable possibilities 
consistent with innocence. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 118; Bingham, 575 P.2d at 199; 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, 118. Instead, the prosecution exhorted the jury to "take a 
speculative leap across ... gap[s]" in the evidence, and the jury obliged. Shumway, 2002 
UT 124, 118. 
This issue is preserved. R.750:35-38. But to the extent the Court believes it is not, 
it should review the issue for plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, 13, 
282 P.3d 1066. "When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error 
doctrine, 'a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support 
a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitted the case to the jury."' Id. (quoting State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,117, 10 P.3d 346). 
For reasons already mentioned, the evidence was insufficient to support James' s 
obstructing justice conviction. The prosecution presented "no evidence" that James 
concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically intending to hinder the 
investigation into Angela's murder. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 117. Therefore, the 
insufficiency of the evidence was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the obstructing justice charge to the jury. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, James asks the Court to reverse his conviction for 
murder and remand for a new trial on that charge. He further asks the Court to reverse his 
viJ conviction for obstructing justice and dismiss that charge for insufficient evidence. 
SUBMITTED this i:?i1 day of January, 2015. 
-
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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UTAH CODE§ 76-5-203 (2012) 
§ 76-5-203. Murder 
,.;; ( 1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
( d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
~ (e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 
VD 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
( o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a 
fireann or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
( c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby causes the death of another; 
( d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to 
the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of 
the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer or military service member in 
~ uniform while in the commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; or 
(iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform under Section 76-5-102.4; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under 
Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
( 4 )(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the 
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a 
reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection ( 4)(a) shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
( c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only from: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense 
does not merge with the crime of murder. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described in 
Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and punished 
for, the separate offense. 
UTAH CODE§ 76-5-205.5 (2012) 
§ 76-5-205.5. Special mitigation reducing the level of criminal homicide 
offense--Burden of proof--Application to reduce offense 
(1) Special mitigation exists when the actor cau_ses the death of another or attempts to 
cause the death of another: 
(a)(i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a 
delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; 
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant 
believed them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal 
justification for the defendant's conduct; and 
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable from the 
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person; or 
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. 
(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or 
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged 
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection {l){a) on the basis of 
mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to 
the mental illness. 
(3) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional distress does not include: 
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (l)(b) shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
(5)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (5)(b) are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under 
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a verdict on 
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection ( 5)(b ). 
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted 
manslaughter. 
(6)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the 
existence of the special mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict 
on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been 
established, it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the 
prosecution has established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
( d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has 
been established, the result is a hung jury. 
(7)(a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the trier of fact, it shall return a 
~ special verdict indicating whether the existence of special mitigation has been found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at the same time as the general 
verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict. 
(8) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any case, reduce the level of an 
offense by more than one degree from that offense, the elements of which the evidence 
has established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
UTAH CODE§ 76-8-306 (2012) 
§ 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice in criminal investigations or proceedings 
--Elements--Penalties--Exceptions 
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense: 
(a) provides any person with a weapon; 
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from performing any act 
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment 
of any person; 
( c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing; 
( d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false; 
( e) harbors or conceals a person; 
( f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding 
discovery or apprehension; 
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire communications 
or of a pending application for an order authorizing the interception of wire 
communications; 
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a 
judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or 
G) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting an 
offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation. 
(2)(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means 
conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this 
section, and includes: 
(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political 
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of the United 
States; and 
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an 
adult. 
(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States, is a: 
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment without 
parole; 
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with 
parole or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years; 
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years; 
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any 
period exceeding one year; and 
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period of 
one year or less. 
(3) Obstruction of justice is: 
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a 
capital felony or first degree felony; 
(b) a third degree felony if: 
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree felony 
and the actor violates Subsection (l)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a capital 
or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (l)(a); 
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or 
(iv) a violation of Subsection ( I )(h); or 
( c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated under 
Subsection (3)(a) or (b). 
( 4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct 
constituting an offense. 
(5) Subsection (l)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed by 
Section 62A-7-402. 
( 6) Subsection ( I )(b) does not apply to: 
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5; 
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316; 
( c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed by 
Section 76-8-508; 
(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by Section 
76-8-508.3; or 
( e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed by Section 
76-8-509. 
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1 ), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony if 
the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official custody as 
defined in Section 76-8-309. 
UTAH R. EVID.106 
RULE 106. REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED 
STATEMENTS 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse 
party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or 
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THE COURT: Okay -
MR. BOEHM: He didn't - I can voir dire the witness 
and we can direct (inaudible). We can even recall him from 
{inaudible). We never introduced a statement of Angela 
Jenkins (inaudible). 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I've got some other things while 
we're standing here. I'm convinced that the right to cross 
examine is more than adequate for this situation, but Rule 
106, the completeness rule, when a party introduces part of a 
recorded statement - this was a recorded statement -
THE COURT: I do (inaudible), the completeness rule 
speaks to completing that statement, where only a fragment of 
the statement is brought in, not to bring in something that 
is pages away from the statement that -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I disagree. 
THE COURT: - was allegedly brought in. So -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I disagree. 
THE COURT: - as I see the completeness rule is, if 
you're asking someone to read a fraction of a statement, and 
that statement on its own or that - without introducing the 
complete - that whole complete statement, it leaves a 
misleading indication, then the completeness rule applies. 
But, to seek -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I - that's where we are. 




























you're telling him is page - something arising on page 8. 
This statement - the statement you were referencing is, I'm 
being told is on page 24. I don't know, I don't have those 
in front of me. But, based on that, I don't believe that the 
completeness rule applies. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well ... 
THE COURT: So, if that's your basis -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I'm going to ask the question 
in a different way. 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. DELLAPIANA: If he wants to -
THE COURT: - you better clear it through me. 
MR. BOEHM: Yeah, I would ask for that (inaudible) 
that he can't just (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yeah. No. I don't - I don't want this 
tainting the jury. You tell me what it is that you're going 
to ask. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay. Well, I'm going to ask a 
question regarding Mr. Sanchez's explanation for the - for 
the assault. 
THE COURT: Then -
MR. BOEHM: (Inaudible) -
MR. DELLAPIANA: This is something that goes to his 
own statement. Regardless of the truth of whether - of 



























THE COURT: Then it doesn't - but it's not a 
statement against the party. It's his own statement that is 
arguably self serving. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, that's for the jury to -
THE COURT: If he wants to take the stand and say 
it, then that's fine. But -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, tell you what, we can spend 
the rest of the afternoon with me cross examining this guy on 
the record and send it up on appeal then, because that's the 
defense. That's our defense. 
MR. BOEHM: I mean, we filed a motion in limine that 
was - talked about the 412, we talked about this yesterday, 
everybody knew that this was going to be a tactic that might 
be employed, but I think that everybody has to recognize that 
either one doesn't allow the statement unless it's offered 
against (inaudible), defense counsel represents the defendant 
(inaudible) cannot ask this witness -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I think we used that argument. 
THE COURT: Yes, you did. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I'm - (inaudible), I specifically 
said, I am not using a party opponent language rule as a way 
to introduce a statement of my client. I -
THE COURT: That's true, what you said is that you 
would elicit it through somebody else's testimony. And what 




























somebody else, it needs to be consistent with the rules of 
evidence, and it cannot be a statement of the individual. I 
said - and I also said that if you, you know, clearly he has 
the right to testify, he clearly has a right not to testify. 
But, if he - if you want to put that in, you're not eliciting 
it on the basis of hearsay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, tell you what, Your Honor. I 
will attempt to ask some different questions about different 
things, and then when I'm done with what is hopefully 
unobjectionable testimony, I'll either - I'll bring it to 
everybody's attention that I'm ready to make -
THE COURT: We will discuss this off the record with 
the jury - out of the presence -
MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah. Okay. 
THE COURT: - of -
MR. BOEHM: Well, and my concern is that - I mean, 
the Court's asking what he - what defense counsel intends to 
ask, because defense counsel seems unfortunately opposed to 
the Court's ruling, and I think -
MR. DELLAPIANA: True. Anyway, go ahead. 
MR. BOEHM: Right? And I think the issue is, 
there's a very big difference between what (inaudible) 
yesterday when the State asked a question and got an 
unexpected response, it was not elicited by the State's 



























Well, what did defendant say about this? (Inaudible) say 
about this, and explain that it - the cat's out of the bag, 
and he's done it intentionally, and knowing that it's not 
admissible, that it's hearsay and that it can't be used. So 
I would ask for a warning that he not do that. 
THE COURT: Don't tempt me, Mr. Dellapiana. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I can't - I'll tell you - I'm going 
to do my best -
THE COURT: Your responsibility is - you need to -
your responsibility is to put in, if you wish to put in 
evidence that would support a - by a preponderance of the 
evidence a standard that you've (inaudible) on some basis. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Sure. 
THE COURT: Admissible evidence. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Right. 
THE COURT: But, you're not going to be introducing 
or leading into something that would be objectionable 
statements. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: We'll see. 
THE COURT: Just to get that on the record -
MR. DELLAPIANA: I will try. 
THE COURT: - that will not happen. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I will try not to do that. 
THE COURT: No. No. You will not do that. 



























client in custody, but not on trial. 
(End of sidebar) 
MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, can we just make a finding 
that the State has objected based on the hearsay and hear 
what the Court's ruling on that -
THE COURT: The State has objected; I have sustained 
the objection. 
MR. BOEHM: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Okay. This cross examination 
may be shorter than I intended. 
The length of the fight - you asked him about how 
long the fight went on. 
A I did. 




Q You described it as last - him saying another time 
it was last night. Do you remember that? 
A I do. 
Q Okay, is that fair to - for most people that can 
mean sometime before dawn? I mean, we refer to - oh, it 
happened last night, could be in the middle of the night. 
A I - I would assume so. Yeah. 
Q All right. You asked him about - he told you that 




Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such conflict as far as you 
reasonably can. But where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must 
detennine from the evidence what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you 
shall determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall determine what 
the facts are in this case. But you should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare all 
of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, in 
order to determine what the facts are. 
1 5 f 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and has the 
right to go upon the witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, the law expressly 
provides that no preswnption adverse to him is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place 
himself upon the witness stand. 
In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of the 
evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the State to prove every essential element of the charge 
against him. The fact that this defendant has not availed himself of the privilege which the law 
gives him should not prejudice him in any way. It should not be considered as any indication of 
either his guilt or his innocence. 
1. 5 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness on his own behalf. The 
defendant's testimony should be received and given the same consideration as you give to that of 
any witness. The fact that the defendant stands accused of a crime is no evidence of his guilt and 
no reason for rejecting his testimony. However, you should weigh the defendant's testimony the 




The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. 
It is the duty of each of you after considering all the evidence in the case, to determine, if 
possible, the question of guilty or innocence of the defendant. When you have reached a 
conclusion in that respect you should not change it merely because one or more of all of your 
fellow jurors may have come to a different conclusion. However, the jurors should freely and 
fairly discuss the evidence and the deductions to be drawn therefrom. If, after doing so, any juror 
should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached was wrong, the juror unhesitatingly should 
abandon that original opinion and render the juror's verdict according to the final decision. 
1. 5 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can find the defendant, James Raphael Sanchez, of the offense of Obstruction 
of Justice, as charged in Count II of the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each one of the following elements of that offense, occurring on or 
about the 5th day of May, 2011, in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
1. That the _defendant, James Raphael Sanchez: 
(a) prevented by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from 
performing any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, 
pros~on, C01'viction, or punishment of any person; or 
(b) altered, -qesti:<?Yed, concealeds or removed any item or o$er thing; 
2. The. the defendant acted with intent to hinder, delay, or pr~ent the investigation, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense; 
3. The defendant's conduct constituted the criminal offense ofmmder. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each one of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant Ouilty of Obstructing Justice as charged in Count II of the Information. If, on the 
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 











Under the law of the State of Utah. strangulation CODStitutes "serious bodily injury." 
... 
1. 5 6 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one of your members to act as 
foreperson, who, as foreperson, will preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 
As to Count I: 
Guilty of Murder; or 
Not Guilty of Murder. 
As to Count II: 
Guilty of Obstruction of Justice; or 
Not Guilty of Obstruction of Justice. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all jurors is required to find a 
verdict. Your verdict must be in writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your verdict has been found, notify the 
bailiff that you are ready to report to the court. 





CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of September, 2013, true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS were made available to the 
attorney listed below for the defendant by hand delivery. 
Ralph Dellapiana 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF RECEIPT 
I hereby certify that I, (please print name) _____________ _, 
acknowledge receiving the above described PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS on the __ day of _________ _, 2_, and further certify 
that this Certificate of Receipt was signed for at the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
or returned the Certificate of Receipt via facsimile transmission to the Salt Lake County District 




9/10/13 UtalP!fiate Courts Mail- Tagalog Interpreter for jurylrlal - 111903?llt' 
Tagalog interpreter for jury trial -111903659 
i message 
Evangelina Burrows <evangelinab@utcourts.gov.> 
To: Kristin Ferguson <kristlnff@utcourts.gov.> 
Tue, Sep 10, 2013at 11:20AM 
A Tagalog interpreter has been requested by the DA's office for a witness In case 111903659, which Is set for trial 
on Sept 17. Nella Justiniano will be Interpret on that date, but must leaw by 3:00 pm because she teaches a 
class in Pro\O. 
I'm still trying to find a second Tagalog interpreter to help with this jury trial. 
https:J/mail.google.com'rreiUii0/7ul::2&ilFbtm99227b&\4ewa<pt&search=lnbolt&.lh=14108e380a7cbdc7 111 
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-RALPH DELLAPIANA (6861) 
TRENTON RICKS (7770) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 I 1 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
fN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH 
THE ST A TE OF UT AH, DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
QUESTIONS TO THE JURY 
PANEL ON VOIR DIRE Plaintiff, 
V. 
JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ, Case No. l 11903659 FS 
JUDGE DENISE LINDBERG Defendant. 
The defendant, James Sanchez, by and through his attorneys of record, respectfully 
submits the following interrogatories for the voir dire of the prospective jurors in the above-numbered 
case. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
I. Where are you employed? 
2. What are your duties there? 
3. How long have you been so employed? 
4. Do you have any plans for a change of employment in the near future? 
5. Have you had any different type of employment for a significant period of time? 
6. What is your marital status? 
160 
7. Where is your spouse employed? 
8. What are his or her duties at that place of employment? 
9. Please state your race. 






State the age and sex of each of these children. 
Which of these children reside with you? 
Are any of these adult children employed? If so: 
Describe the nature and length of this employment. 
Do you belong to any clubs or organizations? If so: 
What clubs or organizations do you belong to? 
What are your hobbies and leisure time activities? 
What do you rely on for your sources of information, i.e., newspapers, magazines, 
television, radio, or word of mouth? 
Do you subscribe to any publications (including newspapers)? If so: which ones? 
Have you lived in any place other than Salt Lake County for any length of time? 
If so: 
Where did you live before you came here? 
Why did you decide to move to Salt Lake County? 
16. Have any of you ever served in the Armed Forces? 
17. 
18. 
What is your educationaJ background? 
What subject did you major in if colJege education? 
19. Do any of you have any close friends or relatives who are lawyers who practice 











What is the name of that friend or relative? 
Where does he or she practice law? 
Would this prevent you in any way in following the instructions on the Jaw as 
given to you by this court? 
Do any of you know the attorneys in this case? 
Do any of you know any of the State's or defense witnesses? 
Do any of you know the defendant, James Sanchez, or any member of his family? 
Do you know anyone employed at the Salt Lake County District Attorney's 
office? 
EXPERIENCE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Have any of you ever been emp]oyed in any sort of law enforcement capacity? If 
so, when and where? 
Do any of you have c1osc friends or relatives who have been employed by any law 
enforcement agency? 
If so, name the friend or re]ation and the agency he or she worked for. 
Wou]d this relationship in any way affect your ability to sit on this jury in a fair 
and impartial manner? 
26. Are there any of you who would tend to give more credibility or weight to the 
testimony of a police officer merely because he or she is a police officer, than you 
would to any other witness? 
3 
tei 
PRJOR JURY AND WITNESS EXPERlENCE 
2 7. Have any of you ever served on a jury before? If so: 
What type of case was it? 
When was the trial? 
Were you the foreperson? 
What was the verdict? 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and 
impartial manner? 
28. Have any of you ever been called as a witness in court before? If so: 
What type of case was it? 
What was the trial or hearing? 
When was the trial or hearing? 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and 
impartial manner? 
PRIOR EXPERIENCE AS A VICTIM OF OR 
WITNESS TO CRIME OR AS A DEFENDANT 
29. Have any of you or your close friends or relatives ever been the victim of a 
criminal offense? lf so: 
What was the nature of the offense? 








Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and 
impartial manner? 
Have any of you or your close friends or relatives ever been accused of a crime 
before? If so: 
What was the nature of the charge? 
What was the final disposition of the case? 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and 
impartial manner? 
Have any of you, your close friends, or relatives ever been a witness to a crime? 
If, so, please describe. 
Was that a traumatic experience? 
Would that experience affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this 
case? 
ABILITY TO BE A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUROR 
I-lave any of you been involved with any group whose goals are to make changes 
in the criminal justice system? If so, what group? What was your involvement? 
Would any of you prefer, for any reason, not to sit on this case? lfso, why do you 
not want to sit on this jury? 
5 
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34. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and impartial state of mind that 
you would not be satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state judge the 
evidence if you or your loved ones were on trial here? In other words, would you 
want someone with your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you were the 
defendant? 
35. Do any of you have any physical problems which would interfere with your ability 
to be a juror in this case? 
36. Do any of you have any negative feelings or opinions about defense attorneys? 
About prosecutors? 
Would those feelings or opinions interfere with your ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror in this case? 
DEFENDANT'S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND RIGHT TO TESTIFY 
37. Does the mere fact that Mr. Sanchez is charged with this offense in the 
Infonnation cause any of you to believe that he is probabJy guilty as charged? 
38. Do you now presume Mr. Sanchez to be innocent of the crime as charged? 
39. Do any of you feel Mr. Sanchez is more likely than not guilty because he has been 
charged with a crime? 
40. Do any of you feel that Mr. Sanchez has, or should have a burden to prove his 
innocence? 
6 







Do you understand that Mr. Sanchez has no obligation to testify? 
Do you nevertheless feel he should come forward and testify? 
Do you promise to place no burden on Mr. Sanchez to prove his innocence, but 
rather require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before you could 
convict Mr. Sanchez of a criminal offense? 
44. If Mr. Sanchez were to testify, would you give his testimony the same weight and 
credit that you would give to any other witness? 
45. 
ABILITY TO INTERACT WITH OTHER JURORS 
If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the conclusion that the prosecution had 
not proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that 
a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would you change your 
verdict only because you were in the minority? 
46. Are there any of you who would not give the benefit of your own individual 
l.i;J judgment in arriving at a verdict in this case? 
4 7. Do any of you jury panelists know each other? If so, explain how you know each 
other. 
Would that acquaintance interfere with your ability to be a fair and impartial juror 





QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO THIS CASE 
Have any of you, your close friends, or family members at any time been the 
victim of domestic violence? (The defendant suggests that members of the jury 
panel who answer affirmatively be allowed to answer the following questions 
privately in chambers.) lfso: 
What were the circumstances of the incident? 
Was anyone charged with a crime regarding that incident? 
If so, what was the result? 
Would that experience make it hard for you to be fair and impartial in this case? 
Have any of you ever received any education or training in the area of domestic 
violence and/or perfonned any volunteer or salaried work with victims of 
domestic violence? 
If so, please describe that education/training/experience. 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and 
impartial manner? 
50. Have any of you, your family members, or close friends been accused, arrested or 
charged with a crime involving an accusation of domestic violence? (The 
defendant suggests that members of the jury panel who answer affirmatively be 
allowed to answer the following questions privately in chambers). 












What happened in court, if the matter was prosecuted? 
Would that experience make it hard for you to be fair and impartial in this case? 
Would the fact that the defendant is alleged to have committed domestic violence 
resulting in the death of the victim make it hard for you to be a fair and impartial 
juror in this case? 
DATED this j£_ day of September, 2013. 
~ 
Trenton Ricks 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's 
Office, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT, 84111, this /ti'- day of September, 2013. 
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didn't he tell you that, I think I might have killed her? 
That's a question that simply required a yes or no answer. 
At that point Mr. Warner then, you know, volunteered the 
statement that added the - at this - you know, uthis time." 
The statement, as has been noted, the jury thereafter, at the 
conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Warner, was given the 
opportunity to ask questions of Mr. Warner. In no way was 
there any question that was - that picked up or responded to 
any suggestion that arguably could've come from that 
volunteered statement. It seems to me that if the issue had 
been present in the minds of the jury, that would've been the 
time when that question would've been expected, not at the 
conclusion of the State's case a day later. 
Additionally, I must consider the totality of the 
evidence that has been admitted, including most notably the 
extensive admissions by the defendant himself. Considering 
that the statement was made in passing, it was not dwelt upon 
by either counsel or the Court, the matter moved on, and when 
compared to the totality of the evidence, it is - if it was 
error, it was at best harmless error. 
Now, the defense has sought to introduce, through 
the testimony of Detective Reyes, evidence regarding certain 
statements made by the defendant, I am understanding, or I'm 
assuming, for the purpose of establishing a basis for 
asserting the special mitigation defense of extreme emotional 
4 
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1 I distress. 
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statements either allegedly made by the victim, either 
admitting or suggesting that she'd been involved sexually 
with the defendant's brother, and/or defendant's own 
statements of his belief that the victim was having sexual 
relations with his brother. The defense counsel has offered 
various alternative grounds for why that testimony should be 
heard by the jury. Specifically, the defense contends that 
failure to allow that evidence violates the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause, that the testimony is admissible under 
the Rule of Completeness and/or Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, under some unspecified rule, which I understood to 
be 608C, to show bias on the detective's part; as a non-
hearsay statement under 801C2, because it's not being offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, or as hearsay that 
falls within the then existing state of mind exception under 
Rule 803-3. 
I have considered each of these grounds separately, 
and I conclude that none of them form a basis for allowing 
introduction of that testimony. In making that 
consideration, I have read all of the cases that were cited 
by the defense and provided to me, as well as my own 
research. 
With respect to the Sixth Amendment argument, the 



























confronted with witnesses against him. To the extent he is 
seeking to elicit his own exculpatory statements through the 
detective, on its face it is clear that his statements are 
not the statements of a witness against him. To the extent 
that he's seeking to elicit statements he attributes to the 
decedent, they would at best be double hearsay, none of which 
falls under an exception was cited. At worst, he would be 
unable to benefit from the victim's unavailability, that by 
his own admission he created, and the alleged statements 
would not fall within any of the exceptions to Rule 804. 
As to his arguments about - based on the - it was 
originally cited as the Rule of Completeness. But I will 
discuss it under both Rrule of Completeness and 106, because 
the defense subsequently submitted a document making a case 
under 106. The Rule of Completeness is a common law rule. 
Our Supreme Court has held that, where the oral - and it's a 
strictly oral statement, it's not been reduced to writing, 
the Rule of Completeness may apply under Rule 611. That was 
not argued to the Court. And certainly no analysis has been 
put forward with respect to Rule 611. But, in any event, the 
Rule of Completeness does not apply in a case like this one 
where, what we have at issue, is the defendant's 
contemporaneously recorded interview, which was then 
transcribed, and in State versus Leleae, I'm not pronouncing 



























case, the - a detective conducted an interview with the 
defendant. The defendant's statements were tape recorded and 
then transcribed. At trial, the defendant's statements 
against interest were introduced through the detective. The 
court found that, although the defendant's oral statement was 
introduced through the detective, the statements were 
recorded and transcribed, and Rule 106 applied - actually, 
were sought to be introduced. The appellate court upheld the 
denial of the defense's motion to introduce the entire 
statement of the defendant for the purpose of, quote, 
uputting the prosecution's requested portion in context." 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused 
its discretion, and decided that this statement should be 
included - excluded. 
In this case, as in that - and that one, the 
defendant's oral statement during his interview with 
Detective Reyes was recorded and transcribed. As such, they 
fall within 106, and not under the Rule of Completeness 
referenced by the defense in its argument initially. Under 
106, the Court must apply a fairness standard in evaluating 
the need for admitting the remainder of a written or recorded 
statement. And under that standard, the court needs to admit 
only those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, 
explain, or place into context the portion that has already 
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statements that are essentially a self-serving, after-the-
fact explanation for his conduct in assaulting the victim, 
and that portion of that overall interview was temporally 
removed from the inculpatory statements that had been 
received without objection on the basis of 801-B-2. 
I conclude that the fairness analysis does not 
require the admission of the statements offered to explain 
the reasons for his brutal assault on the victim. 
Now, initially the defense cited State versus Cruz 
Meza in support of his claim that the statement should be 
received. I disagree. In Cruz Meza, the defendant confessed 
of his murder to a third person, which was an oral statement. 
There the trial court analyzed it essentially under the 
common law rule and excluded it on the basis that the 
statements were not made spontaneously, and lacked the 
indicia of trustworthiness or reliability. The Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's exercise of its discretion. 
In any event, I believe Cruz Meza is 
distinguishable, because the statement at issue was a 
strictly oral statement, and the admissibility analysis was 
made under the common law Rule of Completeness, not under 
103, which the defense has now made clear it is - that is the 
sole basis that it is proceeding under. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: You mean 106? Or -
THE COURT: I'm sorry, 106. I apologize. 
~---_:J 
1 MR. DELLAPIANA: Oh. 
2, THE COURT: I mis-spoke. 
3 Now, I will note that that last analysis or 




reply to the State's motion in limine. I remind counsel that 
I had stricken the State's motion, and had not considered the 
motion in limine because it had been untimely filed. So 
8 there really was nothing to reply to. But, I had invited 





has now provided, and which the defense provided to me 
yesterday evening. 
I also find no merit in the argument that the 
defendant's statement must be received presumably under Rule 












certainly not pointed to any specific facts that would 
support or show that Detective Reyes's testimony was simply 
factually reported on the defendant's inculpatory statements, 
is in any way tainted by bias. The detective's testimony was 
nothing more than a straightforward response to questions put 
to him by both the prosecution and the defense. 
I similarly reject their claim that the statement 
is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, 
and therefore it's not hearsay. If the defendant's 
explanatory statement is, in fact, not being offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted, then the defense has failed to 
9 
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